Enforcing RPKI-based routing policy on the data plane at an internet exchange


Over a decade of work has gone into securing the BGP rout- ing control plane. Through all this, there has been an oft repeated refrain, ”It is acknowledged that rigorous control plane verification does not in any way guarantee that packets follow the control plane.” We describe what may be the first deployment of data plane enforcement of RPKI-based con- trol plane validation. OpenFlow switches providing an ex- change fabric and controlled by a Quagga BGP route server drop traffic for prefixes which have invalid origins without requiring any RPKI support by connected BGP peers.

Proceedings of the third workshop on Hot topics in software defined networking, HotSDN ‘14
Cristel Pelsser
Cristel Pelsser
Critical embedded systems, Computer networking, Researcher, Professor

The focus of my research is on network operations, routing, Internet measurements, protocols and security.