



"Supervising Smart Home Device Interactions: A Profile-Based Firewall Approach"

De Keersmaeker, François ; Sadre, Ramin ; Pelsser, Cristel

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
Supervising Smart Home Device Interactions: A Profile-Based Firewall Approach



François De Keersmaeker, Ramin Sadre, Cristel Pelsser

MOTIVATION

- ❖ **1. Observation:**
IoT devices are an easy target for attackers
- ❖ **2. Hypothesis:**
IoT devices have predictable network traffic patterns
 - Express those patterns in the form of a **profile**
 - **Allow-list** for network traffic



- Device interaction:
- Step 1: Motion sensor activates
 - Step 2: Light turns on

❖ 3. State-of-the-Art:

IETF's MUD standard (RFC 8520 [1])

👍 MAC addresses, IP addresses, ports

👎 Other (application layer) protocols

- (m)DNS, HTTP, IGMP, CoAP, etc.

👎 Traffic statistics

- Duration, packet count, packet rate, etc.

Device interactions

- Core of home automation systems

❖ 4. Potential attacks complying with MUD profile


- ✓ **A.** Spurious command, breaking the interaction patterns
 - A1.** from LAN; **A2.** from WAN
- ✓ **B.** Compromised device communicating over DNS with attacker's server

A PROFILE-BASED & INTERACTION-AWARE SMART HOME FIREWALL

```
device-info:
  name: my-device
  mac: 00:11:22:33:44:55
  ipv4: 192.168.1.100

patterns:
  dns-p:
    protocols:
      dns:
        qtype: A
        domain-name: my.server.com
      udp:
        dst-port: 53
      ipv4:
        src: self
        dst: gateway
    bidirectional: true
    stats:
      packet-count: 4


interactions:
  dns-https-server:
    dns-server: !include patterns.dns-p
    https-server:
      protocols:
        tcp:
          dst-port: 443
        ipv4:
          src: self
          dst: my.server.com
        bidirectional: true
        stats:
          rate: 50/second
```



- ❖ **B. Implemented with NFTables & NFQueue**
 - Novel Linux base firewall
 - ✓ Lightweight & portable
 - Inspects live traffic
 - Offload packets to a user-space program for further processing
 - Finite State Machine to support interactions


❖ C. Profile translator

- Input: device profiles and file templates
- Output: NFTables & NFQueue files




EVALUATION

❖ Experimental network



❖ Latency in attack-free scenarios



no-firewall: self-explanatory

base-firewall: default firewall

my-firewall: our firewall configured for **one** device

all-devices: our firewall configured for **all** devices

References

[1] E. Lear, R. Droms, and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage Description Specification," Internet Requests for Comments, RFC Editor, RFC 8520, Mar. 2019.

Icons from flaticon.com