Enforcing RPKI-based routing policy on the data plane at an internet exchange

@inproceedings{Bailey2014,
	title        = {Enforcing RPKI-based routing policy on the data plane at an internet exchange},
	author       = {Josh Bailey and Dean Pemberton and Andy Linton and Cristel Pelsser and Randy Bush},
	year         = 2014,
	month        = aug,
	booktitle    = {Proceedings of the third workshop on Hot topics in software defined networking, {HotSDN} '14},
	publisher    = {ACM},
	address      = {Chicago, IL, USA},
	pages        = {211--212},
	doi          = {10.1145/2620728.2620769},
	editor       = {Aditya Akella and Albert G. Greenberg},
	abstract     = {Over a decade of work has gone into securing the BGP rout- ing control plane. Through all this, there has been an oft repeated refrain, ”It is acknowledged that rigorous control plane verification does not in any way guarantee that packets follow the control plane.” We describe what may be the first deployment of data plane enforcement of RPKI-based con- trol plane validation. OpenFlow switches providing an ex- change fabric and controlled by a Quagga BGP route server drop traffic for prefixes which have invalid origins without requiring any RPKI support by connected BGP peers.},
	bibsource    = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org},
	biburl       = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigcomm/BaileyPLPB14.bib},
	groups       = {International Conferences},
	keywords     = {BGP, RPKI, Routing Security, OpenFlow, security}
}