Enforcing RPKI-Based Routing Policy on the Data Plane at an Internet Exchange
Josh Bailey , Dean Pemberton , Andy Linton , Cristel Pelsser and Randy Bush
This 2014 conference poster, by Josh Bailey and 4 coauthors, was presented at HotSDN 2014 (Poster session). Topics covered include BGP, RPKI, routing security, OpenFlow, and security.
Full author list: Josh Bailey, Dean Pemberton, Andy Linton, Cristel Pelsser, and Randy Bush.
Abstract
Over a decade of work has gone into securing the BGP rout- ing control plane. Through all this, there has been an oft repeated refrain, ”It is acknowledged that rigorous control plane verification does not in any way guarantee that packets follow the control plane.” We describe what may be the first deployment of data plane enforcement of RPKI-based con- trol plane validation. OpenFlow switches providing an ex- change fabric and controlled by a Quagga BGP route server drop traffic for prefixes which have invalid origins without requiring any RPKI support by connected BGP peers.
Publication Details
- Publication Type
- poster
- Publication Date
- August 2014
- Published In
- HotSDN 2014 (Poster session)
- Location
- Chicago, IL, USA
- Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
- 10.1145/2620728.2620769
- External Link
- https://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2014/hotsd…
Suggested citation
Josh Bailey, Dean Pemberton, Andy Linton, Cristel Pelsser, and Randy Bush. 2014. Enforcing RPKI-Based Routing Policy on the Data Plane at an Internet Exchange. In HotSDN 2014 (Poster session). Chicago, IL, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/2620728.2620769
BibTeX Citation
BibTeX Citation
@poster{Bailey2014a,
title = {Enforcing RPKI-Based Routing Policy on the Data Plane at an Internet Exchange},
author = {Josh Bailey and Dean Pemberton and Andy Linton and Cristel Pelsser and Randy Bush},
year = 2014,
month = aug,
booktitle = {{HotSDN} 2014 (Poster session)},
address = {Chicago, IL, USA},
doi = {10.1145/2620728.2620769},
url = {https://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2014/hotsdn.php},
abstract = {Over a decade of work has gone into securing the BGP rout- ing control plane. Through all this, there has been an oft repeated refrain, ”It is acknowledged that rigorous control plane verification does not in any way guarantee that packets follow the control plane.” We describe what may be the first deployment of data plane enforcement of RPKI-based con- trol plane validation. OpenFlow switches providing an ex- change fabric and controlled by a Quagga BGP route server drop traffic for prefixes which have invalid origins without requiring any RPKI support by connected BGP peers.},
groups = {Posters},
keywords = {BGP, RPKI, Routing Security, OpenFlow, security}
}
Related publications
RPKI Time-of-Flight: Tracking Delays in the Management, Control, and Data Planes
Romain Fontugne, Amreesh Phokeer, and Cristel Pelsser, et al.
Passive and Active Measurement PAM, 2023
A System to Detect Forged-Origin Hijacks
Thomas Holterbach, Thomas Alfroy, and Amreesh Phokeer, et al.
21st USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 24), 2024
Exploiting Vulnerabilities at IXP Route Servers to Perform Stealth BGP Hijacks
Gabby Rimlinger, Joaquim Pereira, and Matthieu Gouel, et al.
ACM CCS 2026, 2026
Measuring BGP Route Origin Registration and Validation
Daniele Iamartino, Cristel Pelsser, and Randy Bush
Passive and Active Measurement - 16th International Conference, PAM 2015, 2015