Measuring BGP Route Origin Registration and Validation
Daniele Iamartino , Cristel Pelsser and Randy Bush
This 2015 international conference paper, by Daniele Iamartino and 2 coauthors, was presented at Passive and Active Measurement - 16th International Conference, PAM 2015. Topics covered include autonomous system, address space, origin validation, route origin, and route validation.
Full author list: Daniele Iamartino, Cristel Pelsser, and Randy Bush.
Abstract
BGP, the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol, was designed without considering security. Recently, network operators have experienced hijacks of their network prefixes, often due to BGP misconfiguration by other operators, sometimes maliciously. In order to address this, prefix origin validation, based on a RPKI infrastructure, was proposed and developed. Today, many organizations are registering their data in the RPKI to protect their prefixes from accidental mis-origination. However, some organizations submit incorrect information to the RPKI repositories or announce prefixes that do not exactly match what they registered. Also, the RPKI repositories of Internet registries are not operationally reliable. The aim of this work is to reveal these problems via measurement. We show how important they are, try to understand the main causes of errors, and explore possible solutions. In this longitudinal study, we see the impact of a policy which discards route announcements with invalid origins would have on the routing table, and to a lesser extent on the traffic at the edge of a large research network.
Publication Details
- Publication Type
- Conference Paper
- Publication Date
- March 2015
- Published In
- Passive and Active Measurement - 16th International Conference, PAM 2015
- Volume & Issue
- Vol. 8995
- Pages
- 28–40
- Publisher
- Springer
- Location
- New York, NY, USA
- Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
- 10.1007/978-3-319-15509-8_3
Suggested citation
Daniele Iamartino, Cristel Pelsser, and Randy Bush. 2015. Measuring BGP Route Origin Registration and Validation. In Passive and Active Measurement - 16th International Conference, PAM 2015. Springer, New York, NY, USA, 28–40. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15509-8_3
BibTeX Citation
BibTeX Citation
@inproceedings{Iamartino2015,
title = {Measuring BGP Route Origin Registration and Validation},
author = {Daniele Iamartino and Cristel Pelsser and Randy Bush},
year = 2015,
month = mar,
booktitle = {Passive and Active Measurement - 16th International Conference, {PAM} 2015},
publisher = {Springer},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
volume = 8995,
pages = {28--40},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-15509-8_3},
editor = {Jelena Mirkovic and Yong Liu},
abstract = {BGP, the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol, was designed without considering security. Recently, network operators have experienced hijacks of their network prefixes, often due to BGP misconfiguration by other operators, sometimes maliciously. In order to address this, prefix origin validation, based on a RPKI infrastructure, was proposed and developed. Today, many organizations are registering their data in the RPKI to protect their prefixes from accidental mis-origination. However, some organizations submit incorrect information to the RPKI repositories or announce prefixes that do not exactly match what they registered. Also, the RPKI repositories of Internet registries are not operationally reliable. The aim of this work is to reveal these problems via measurement. We show how important they are, try to understand the main causes of errors, and explore possible solutions. In this longitudinal study, we see the impact of a policy which discards route announcements with invalid origins would have on the routing table, and to a lesser extent on the traffic at the edge of a large research network.},
bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org},
biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/conf/pam/IamartinoPB15.bib},
groups = {International Conferences},
keywords = {Autonomous System, Address Space, Origin Validation, Route Origin, Route Validation}
}
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